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Abstract
A young person presents with a highly malignant brain tumour with hemiparesis and limited prognosis
after resection. She then suffers an iatrogenic cardiac and respiratory arrest that results in profound
anoxic encephalopathy. A difference in opinion between the treatment team and the parent is based on
a question of futile therapy. Opinions from five intensivists from around the world explore the
differences in ethical and legal issues. A Physician-ethicist comments on the various approaches.
Keywords critical care, ethics, medical futility, negotiating, palliative care
Introduction
Jean-Louis Vincent
Intensive care unit (ICU) staff are confronted on an almost
daily basis by difficult and emotive ethical issues, but perhaps
none more so than when a child is involved. In such situations,
although the primary duty of care rests with the child, patient
advocates (i.e. the parents or guardian) are more naturally and
closely involved than is perhaps the case with adult patients
[1]. In all ethical situations, decision making is very subjective
and dependent, among other factors, on individual experience
and beliefs, and cultural and religious background [2,3].
Although there is now a considerable literature on end-of-life
decision making in the adult ICU population, much less has
been written about paediatric patients, although many deaths
in paediatric ICUs are now preceded by a decision to forgo or
limit life-sustaining therapy [4].
Here we present a case of a child with a short life expectancy
who then experiences an iatrogenic episode that leads to
irreversible anoxic encephalopathy. The case scenario
provokes many questions, in particular related to differences
in opinion between staff and parents regarding the value of
continuing active care. To explore international differences in
the ethical and legal issues involved, intensivists from Russia,
Germany, USA, Singapore and Japan were asked how they
would approach such a case.214
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The case
An 11-year-old girl was admitted to the ICU following a
partial resection of a highly malignant brain tumour.
Prognosis was estimated at less than 1 year. In the days
following surgery the patient remained somnolent and
hemiparetic, but she followed simple commands on her
unaffected side. A tracheotomy and feeding tube were
placed on postoperative day 8 with some difficulty because
of the patient’s body habitus.
The next day the tracheotomy tube was inadvertently
dislodged, and reinserting the tracheotomy tube into the
trachea proved difficult. The patient experienced a respiratory
and cardiac arrest before the tube could be effectively
replaced. After resuscitation, the child was found to be in a
severe postanoxic coma with decerebrate movements. The
electroencephalogram exhibited global reduction in electrical
activity, and the evoked potentials were abnormal. A consulted
neurologist opined that there was no hope of recovery.
The team concluded that continuing therapy would be futile,
and that discontinuation of active treatment should be
presented to the parents as the best option. The father said
that he understood the prognosis but he held out hope that
the physicians could be wrong and there might be some
glimmer of hope. If the patient were maintained then God
might decide to intervene. He requested continuation of care
indefinitely.
The ICU staff expressed concerns with respect to continuing
care. They acknowledged that the child may eventually
progress to indolent skilled nursing care but would never be
reanimated in the sense that the family desired. They team
felt that continued care represented the prolongation of futile
therapy for a child whose brain has been lost from severe
postanoxic brain damage, and evolution of the brain tumor
would prevent any substantial long-term neurological
recovery. Furthermore, if a second tracheotomy complication
should occur, then repeat correction of tracheotomy function
could possibly be seen as battery because the risks clearly
exceeded the benefits.
What would you do in this case?
A Russian opinion
Michael Karakozov
Ongoing intensive care is futile and could be construed as
battery. Without knowing the child’s will and with respect to
the father’s wishes, however, I would continue life-sustaining
treatment contingent on available resources. A qualified
psychologist should be involved in talks with the family to
relieve suffering and to reinforce the message that continued
treatment is futile. Also, the parents could take part in the
child’s care if so desired.
This approach does not violate Russian law. However, the
law presents a contrasting problem. Russian law regarding
public health care declares the patient’s right (for adults
>15 years old) to refuse any kind of treatment; however, it
also prohibits withdrawing life support, even if the patient
demands it. No one in Russia has the right to withdraw life
support (e.g. ventilator support or inotropes) if the withdrawal
would quickly lead to cardiac arrest, even if the dying person
is to receive optimal palliative care. If the parents were to
insist that such therapy be discontinued, then the hospital
administration would have the right to appeal to the courts, to
‘defend’ the rights of the child.
In current Russian medicine there is no clear definition of the
term ‘end-of-life care’. The lack of research into this issue,
together with traditional post-Soviet paternalism and
budgetary constraints in the health care system, confound a
systematic approach to optimizing the quality of care
received by a dying patient. Hospice care is limited, and
qualified home care is the exception to the general rule.
The patient’s relatives can request to participate in medical
conferences with the various specialists involved in the
dying patient’s care, but traditionally this happens
infrequently (relatives do not ask for such participation and
doctors do not offer it). A generally inappropriate level of
care and often unsatisfactory hospital–family
communication can foster distrust between health care
providers, patients and relatives. This distrust is even more
pronounced when it comes to withholding life-sustaining
treatment. Personal communication with intensivists from
different Russian regions confirm that the overwhelming
majority of parents insist on continuing intensive care for
their dying children.
It is clear that none of tradition, modern Russian law, and
current practice in the Russian health care system support
withholding life support in futile cases. Russian culture at this
time is not ready to add this option to existing ones for
end-of-life care. Likewise, life support measures cannot
currently be withdrawn from dying patients. What this means
is that the majority of postoperative patients whose chances
of recovery are negligible die in the ICU setting. Only when
patients can be weaned from inotropes and mechanical
ventilation is a transfer to the general ward considered.
Although the usual quality of care on the ward is poor, the
level of palliative and nursing care in Russian ICUs is hardly
satisfactory. Likewise, good health care options for dying
patients in Russia currently do not exist, despite the best
efforts of health care providers.215
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A German opinion
Thomas Marx
In the present case it is the neurologist’s opinion that the
patient’s likely outcome is an apallic (persistent vegetative)
state (if not in the short term then in the long term, because of
the primary diagnosis). It is not clear whether the termination of
active therapy proposed by the ICU staff extends to stopping
administration of fluids and nutrition, and controlled ventilation,
and opting not to treat complications (i.e. infections,
pneumonia). In our practice, withdrawal of fluids or nutrition is
seen to be unethical, whereas termination of controlled
ventilation can be considered in hopeless cases (it is not
indicated whether the patient is breathing spontaneously).
The German juridical/ethical position, as described in the
literature and in a lecture by Professor R Merkel (University of
Hamburg, Department of Juridical Science, lecture entitled
‘Limitations of medical therapy’ given at the University of Ulm,
Department of Pediatrics, March 2004), emphasizes that
conservation of life is of the highest priority. Exceptions to this
are as follows [5–8]: in a terminally ill patient who is suffering,
treatment with death as a possible side effect is permissible
(indirect euthanasia); life support may be terminated in cases
where the process of dying has begun and therapy would just
extend the dying process (passive euthanasia); and life
support may be refused by the conscious patient (the right to
live does not mean the duty to suffer).
A patient in an an apallic state may be expected to have no
perception of pain, therefore obviating any end-of-life
decisions in the present situation based on ending the
patient’s suffering. An apallic patient does neither suffer
anymore nor is in an acute dying process – a process that
may be hastened by the development of complications.
Two factors complicate the case: an iatrogenic complication,
and at least one of the relatives opposes the decision to end
therapy.
My opinion is as follows. The medical staff view the father’s
position as emotional and based on ‘feelings’, regarding
their own standpoint to be rational, based on experience
and therefore superior. I strongly oppose that standpoint.
To the staff it should be clear that irrational beliefs also play
an important role in their decision making. I have not found
any references on the following and would nevertheless like
to introduce it into the discussion. From the standpoint of
‘irrationality’, the ICU staff recommendation to end life
support can be viewed within the context of findings in
nurses working in geriatric institutions [9]; because the
mortality rate of their patients is 100% and they routinely
experience the absolute ‘futility’ of their efforts, these
nurses have the highest workload and the greatest
percentage of burnout. Ending a patient’s therapy is no
cure for the ICU team’s loss of hope.
Ethically I cannot see any reason to overrule the parent’s
decision in the present situation. They have probably already
given consent for a procedure with a known tragic outcome.
Their views must be given careful consideration in all
discussions.
Our position would be as follows. We principally aim to gain
the consent of a patient’s relatives. We would try to wean the
patient from the ventilator as soon as possible, discussing
with them the consequences of caring for a patient in an
apallic state. If new complications occur, then other
decisions can be made, possibly with the consent of the
parents. This approach allows us to consider the feelings of
the family, to give them time to accept the situation and to
say their goodbyes, to avoid giving the impression that the
patient’s case is being fast-tracked, and to have enough time
to gain consent.
An American opinion
Scott Gunn
At issue in this case are fundamental questions about clinical
decision making at the end of life when interested parties
disagree as to the best course of action [10]. Are patients or
doctors in the best position to determine the course of
treatment? The physician’s goals should be to sustain life
and relieve suffering. When these goals become mutually
exclusive the wishes of the patient should prevail [11]. In
general, the principle of patient autonomy remains
paramount. However, physicians are not obliged to deliver
medical care that, in their best professional judgement, does
not have a reasonable chance of benefiting their patients
[12]. Disagreements regarding goals of therapy affect patient
care, family satisfaction and the health care team’s ability to
function.
I would first attempt to delineate what the parents might
consider futile care for their child and to define for them what
therapies are within acceptable limits for the health care
team. Ideally, these discussions should emphasize the shared
decision making process between parents and physicians.
Realizing that prognostication is an imperfect science, we
should use caution when relaying information about
prognosis to families. Recent evidence suggests that the
strongest predictors of withdrawal of mechanical ventilation216
are not prospectively validated severity of illness scores but
rather the physician’s own predictions about the likelihood of
a meaningful recovery [13]. This possible bias could lead to a
self-fulfilling prophecy. It is not necessary, and indeed it is
unlikely, to have absolute certainty of outcome before
withdrawal of life sustaining medical therapy [12]. These
issues will most often require more than one discussion with
the family. Many families need time to deal with the emotional
realities of the imminent loss of a loved one.
If additional discussions are warranted, then I would include
extended family members, clergy and other medical
consultants. If an ICU support group exists, then the family
should be offered an opportunity to meet with parents who
have faced similar decisions. If these efforts are unsuccessful
at bringing about a resolution, then the hospital ethics
committee should be consulted. A recent randomized trial of
ethics consultation in the ICU has found that consultation
shortens the duration of life sustaining medical therapies in
patients who ultimately have these therapies withdrawn and
that most families found the consultation to be helpful [14].
Finally, if the parents maintain their decision to continue life
sustaining medical therapy and the health care team feels
morally unable to provide it, then transfer to another
institution or health care provider (with the family’s and
accepting institution’s approval) may be sought. When the
patient’s family and physicians cannot be reconciled,
however, any appeals to the US judicial system in a
prospective manner for arbitration will almost invariably lead
to continued care [15].
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A Singaporean opinion
Ian KS Tan
I assume the father is the person with parental responsibility,
and that the opinion expressed by the ICU staff is unanimous.
Given the age and condition of the girl, any opinions
expressed by the girl before hospitalization would probably
not be meaningful.
There is not a lot more that can be done for this unfortunate
girl. ‘Active’ treatment revolves around provision of artificial
nutrition and hydration, and routine nursing (suctioning, turning,
and bladder and bowel care). Death was predicted to occur in
‘less than a year’ from the ‘highly malignant brain tumour’, and
death or poor neurological outcome from the cardiac arrest is
also predicted [16,17]. Care decisions therefore determine
different ways of dying. The father may feel that ‘If the patient
were maintained then God might decide to intervene’, but
divine intervention can occur after death too and should not
impact on the question of continuing care.
Although under common law I am not required to provide care
that is counter to the best interests of the patient [18], and it is
the treating doctor – with advice from the rest of the health care
team – who decides on treatment [19], discontinuing care
creates conflict. Furthermore, withdrawing therapy should not
routinely involve hospital administrators or hospital ethics
committees, who have no better understanding of the situation
than do doctors who are familiar with the patient’s illness and
who are in close contact with the relatives. Only where
adversarial relationships and lack of trust has occurred is
recourse to committees and the authority of the courts required.
Establishing commonality of purpose is important. I would
explain to the father that relief of pain and suffering is the
chief goal of care. It is very unusual that this would be
rejected. When trust is established, then scenarios can be
discussed in which care can be viewed in the light of not
prolonging pain and suffering, rather than one in which the
body is maintained for the purpose of divine intervention.
Examples could include the treatment of recurrent infections
and bedsores, which would be inevitable despite ‘active care’
of the highest quality. Antibiotic treatment or continued
nutrition could then be construed as contributing to
continued recurrent suffering.
I would not immediately withdraw artificial nutrition, hydration
and routine nursing care. I would encourage the nurses to
teach the father how to perform nursing care. If the father
desires to ‘maintain’ the girl, then this request would
generally not be refused. Participation and involvement
contributes to the idea that all parties work together rather
than in an adversarial manner.
Given time, the prognosis and the futility of active intervention
for complications, and possibly the futility of even routine
care will become apparent to the father. Given time, the
patient will die too. It is unimportant what decisions are
made, or which party ‘wins’ in the decision making process,
and when. It is important that the patient be accorded every
dignity, that pain and suffering be minimized, and that human
relationships are maintained.
A Japanese opinion
Satoru Hashimoto
I should like to view this scenario from my practice as a full-
time intensivist in Japan. I can recall several similar cases,
each with its own unique character and many factors that led
to somewhat different conclusions. First, I cannot ignore the217
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Discussion
Dan Thompson
An ill child frequently elicits many emotions both by family
and staff. A child has not lived long enough to have an
opinion on end-of-life issues, and we depend on surrogates
who, like those of us who are parents, are always hopeful that
things will turn out all right for our children. Sometimes we
can appear to think in what some may consider an irrational
manner. When an iatrogenic complication happens, we tend
to feel a special responsibility that is different than if the
problem occurred by more natural means. Is this less
irrational than the thinking of the father?
In Western thought we tend to think of autonomy as
paramount and group justice secondary. With a child, the
individual’s autonomy is expressed by the parents. We do not
know whether there is another parent. How parents interact
is very culture dependant, as is the staff response [21].
Three issues arise from the various perspectives. Futility is a
difficult and very value laden concept, and probably does not
have a significant role to play here [22]. There needs to be a
transition from cure to comfort in the care of this individual.
During this transition it must be recognized that different
cultures will have different issues with the process. Legal
issues may predominate, as in the Russian or New York or
Missouri State perspectives, as may religious and ethnic
issues, as discussed in the Japanese position and by Fisher
[21]. The range of capabilities of the local system may make
both issues either easier or more difficult.
We should recognize that we care for both patients and
families. It is easy to forget that for families the dying process,
which is so familiar to us, is a new experience, especially
when it involves children. We need to provide support for
families during surrogate decision making, even when we do
not agree with the results [23]. Consensus building and
allowing the father to learn what it means to provide every
day care may allow him to put the realities of his ‘waiting for a
miracle’ into prospective. These efforts may also be
therapeutic, and he may come to understand the present
situation of his child.
As medical care providers, we not only preserve life as we
know and accept it, but at the same time do not want to do
things that we find morally inappropriate. In their positions
described above, each writer respected the right of the father
in this situation. We understand that there is a limit to what
we can do. Frequently, those who we care for or their families
have unrealistic goals that result in conflict. Did the father
understand the child’s prognosis or was he just waiting for an
unlikely event to happen? Even a paternalistic view was
moderated with the concept of consensus building [24,25]:
‘Mediating differences about treatment decisions is the most
difference in ethnic background. Cultural differences in Far
Eastern countries such as Japan, Korea and China are
important in understanding decisions to withhold or withdraw
care at the end of life. Do-not-resuscitate orders are still rare
in these cultures [20]. Japan, although wealthy and
developed, has had very few cadaveric heart or liver
transplants since the 1997 law allowing organ harvesting
after brain death. Since then, only 30 brain-dead donors have
been reported. Whereas, about 2000 living-related liver
transplants have been carried out in the same period. Since
then, only 20 adult heart transplantations have been
performed. Diagnosing brain death in patients under 15 years
old is not yet legal. There are many Asian parties who oppose
the concept of brain death as a criterion for end-of-life. In
Japan it is interesting to note that, even if family members
pursue a miracle, then their attitudes suggest that this is
rarely for religious reasons. The national insurance system will
allow us to give almost limitless life support, sometimes
costing more than US$100,000 a month, with almost no
expense to the family.
We should bear in mind that there are many disabled
children and adults who need comprehensive chronic
medical care but are still cherished by their families. If there is
a chance that the child might survive, even in a decerebrate
form and for a limited time, and the family has the slightest
hope, then I would not insist on withdrawing any ongoing
active therapy. In my view, this care is not futile. Reasonable
recommendations on limiting care might vary between
different countries, but I might even suggest to the father that
a second tracheostomy be done by an expert laryngologist to
secure her life, even though it could result in a persistent
tracheocutaneous fistula. On the other hand, I probably
would not resort to extracorporeal membrane oxygenation or
other aggressive cardiac life support. I would not withdraw
mechanical ventilation or nutritional support.
We are not ready yet to give up on this patient. I believe that it
is imperative to educate the family on the risks and benefits of
proposed therapies in order to prepare for the next choice.
The team decision making process involves educating the
family as to the most effective and ethical decisions. Then, I
would wait until the father inevitably accepts his daughter’s
predicted death – it is only a matter of time. It is in the best
interests of the patient and our health care system that we
exercise patience. Of course, I am aware that there might be a
malpractice lawsuit for the first dislodgement of the tracheal
tube, but that is beside the point. I think it is senseless to
discuss futility in this case at this point. I would continue to
treat the patient until the family accepts the situation.218
important conflict resolution tool available to physicians.’ It is
of prime importance to remember that resolution involves
support of the staff as well as family.
Consensus building with mediation may allow a reasoned
approach to the problem. Although some feel that outside
help may be problematic, others feel that outside help may
be valuable. I suggest that mediation with outside help may
be important for all [26].
Follow up
After the tracheotomy tube was replaced, the young patient
was transferred for a few days to the floor and from there to a
chronic care facility, where she died a few weeks later. As
expected, she never regained consciousness. Her parents
were globally satisfied with her care in these last weeks of
her life.
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